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Abstract
Contemporary studies on interest group politics have mainly used single interest organizations as their central objects of
study. This has led to a rich body of knowledge on the motivations of interest group mobilization, strategy development
and even policy access and influence. The focus on single interest groups, however, has resulted in limited knowledge on
aggregate patterns of interest groups’ activity. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by examining patterns of mobi-
lization and conflict of interest groups’ activity in EU legislative policymaking. To do so, it adopts a unique policy-centred
research design and an empirical assessment of policy mobilization for a sample of 125 EU legislative proposals based on
extensive media coding as well as structured elite interviews. We find that levels of policy mobilization vary substantively
across different legislative proposals and that political conflict between interest groups is remarkably low. This suggests
that interest group conflict and mobilization contribute little to EU politicization and that in cases where interest groups
voice opposing positions, conflicts do not occur between business and non-business groups. Our findings have important
implications for our understanding of interest groups in EU legislative policymaking.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary studies on interest group politics mostly
take single interest organizations as their analytical point
of departure. This has led to rich insights into the moti-
vations of mobilization, strategy development, and even
policy influence. The focus on single interest groups,
however, has resulted in limited knowledge on aggre-
gate patterns of interest group mobilization and con-
flict. This article seeks to address this lacuna, by iden-
tifying patterns of mobilization and conflict of inter-
est groups’ activity in EU legislative policymaking. Inter-
est groups’ mobilization is often thought to significantly
contribute to policymaking dynamics in the European
Union (EU). While many interest groups populate Brus-
sels (Berkhout & Lowery, 2008), this does not mean that
interest groups’ political activities contribute to political
polarization in the EU (but see Dür, Bernhagen, & Mar-
shall, 2015; Klüver, 2011; Koopmans, 2007; Mahoney,
2004, 2008). With this study, we seek to clarify the role
of interest groups in the EU by systematically exploring
both the extent to which they mobilize on specific leg-
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islative policy proposals as well as the conflicts result-
ing from varying levels of mobilization. From an elitist
perspective, we could expect interest mobilization to be
dominated by corporate and affluent lobby groups (Ol-
son, 1965; Schattschneider, 1960). Based onmore recent
accounts, which characterize EU interest mobilization as
“chameleon pluralism”, in contrast, we rather expect that
the prevalence of either specific or diffuse groups is likely
to vary according to the issues and policy areas in ques-
tion (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013).
We add to these theoretical perspectives by explor-
ing the conflicts that divide mobilized interest popula-
tions. Implicitly, elitists have assumed that interest group
conflict is characterized by structural divides between
specific or upper-class segments of society on the one
hand and diffuse or disadvantaged segments of society
on the other hand (Olson, 1965; Schattschneider, 1960).
This assumption gave rise to a rich body of empirical
studies exploring the extent and nature of bias in favour
of specific business groups over civil society or diffuse
interests (see for instance Dür et al., 2015). We assess
the scope and external validity of this implicit assump-
tion by exploring the nature of interest group conflict in
the EU on a random sample of policy proposals. In addi-
tion, we address an implicit assumption in interest group
studies, something we could call the “pluralist fallacy”,
which leads us and others often to assume that where
there are policies, there will be interest group mobiliza-
tion and contestation. Yet, the few systematic country
studies that exist (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Burstein,
2014; Halpin, 2011) and our study on the EU find that in
a majority of policy-making processes there is little or no
interest group lobbying. Both varying levels of interest
group mobilization and the resulting conflicts have been
shown to have a systematic impact on the politics and
the outcomes of policymaking processes across different
political systems (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech,
& Kimball, 2009; Berkhout et al., 2015; Burstein, 2014;
Halpin, 2011; LaPira, Thomas, & Baumgartner, 2014). To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to inves-
tigate variance in levels of policy mobilization by interest
groups for a sample of EU legislative proposals, as well as
being the first to study the resultant patterns of conflict.
Our analysis of interest groups’ policy mobilization
and the resultant conflict patterns takes actual legislative
policymaking processes as a point of departure.Wedo so
to avoid biased inferences on groups’ relevance in EU pol-
icymakingwhichmay result froma focus on a few “impor-
tant” cases, i.e. policies that were strongly contested by
numerous political actors (e.g., Dür &Mateo, 2014; Lind-
gren & Persson, 2008). To this end, we study policy mobi-
lization by interest groups on 125 EU legislative propos-
als that were initiated by the European Commission (EC)
between 2008 and 2010. We adopt the established defi-
nition of interest groups as private, i.e., non-state, organi-
zationswhich do not hold public office and that advocate,
amongst other things, different societal, economic and
political ideas and interests. Although they are certainly
not the only instruments for EU policymaking, legislative
acts embody important EU policies as they apply gener-
ally and are binding. Moreover, from a research design
perspective, legislative policies are a good choice as they
allow one to study lobbying on policies that are equiva-
lent in legal and institutional terms.
Our analysis shows, in linewith the legislative politics
literature (Hix & Hoyland, 2013; Mattila, 2009), that only
a small amount of legislative lobbying is characterized by
high levels of policymobilizationwhile formost instances
we observe low levels of policy mobilization. Moreover,
and in contrast to a popular view, instances where busi-
ness and non-business groups explicitly oppose each
other―which we call structural conflict―are quite un-
common. Our analysis thus shows a much less dominant
fault line of business pitted against NGOs than is com-
monly assumed and reflected in the business vs non-
business distinction that is prevalent in much interest
group research. Indirectly, our observations lend support
to the proposition that the politicization of EU politics
does not primarily stem from conflicts among interest
groups, but rather from party politics, territorial (mem-
ber state driven) conflict, or inter-institutional conflict.
The article is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we introduce and define the three main concepts
upon which we rely to structure our analysis: policy mo-
bilization, policy polarization, and between-group divi-
siveness. We subsequently describe the policy-centred
research design that we applied. The fourth section
presents the results on the scope of policy mobilization
and the nature of conflicts in EU legislative lobbying. We
conclude the article with a brief summary of our results
and a discussion on future research.
2. Policy Mobilization by Interest Groups and Political
Conflict in EU Legislative Policymaking
We argue that studying both policy mobilization and
interest group conflict as two distinct yet related phe-
nomena adds to our knowledge on to the role of inter-
est groups in EU legislative policymaking. To date, most
quantitative studies have examined varying levels of in-
terest group access to the EU’s institutional venues and
have excluded policy polarization. (Bouwen, 2004; Dür &
Mateo, 2012; Eising, 2004, 2007; for exceptions see: Dür
et al., 2015; Klüver, 2011). In their studies of lobbying
in the United States, however, Baumgartner et al., show
that only a few policy proposals led to considerable pol-
icy polarization with interest groups taking very differ-
ent positions on the respective proposal (2009, p. 61).
This shows that there are good reasons to suggest that
the number of groups and type of conflict are associ-
ated and that studying both mobilization rates as well
as the level and degree of political conflict associated
with concrete policy proposals adds to our understand-
ing of position-taking in EU legislative policymaking. By
investigating these aspects of EU interest group politics,
we add to the literature on the nature of (EU) inter-
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est group politics (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013; Olson, 1965;
Schattschneider, 1960). Moreover, we add to the litera-
ture on the (non-) politicization of the EU (De Wilde, Le-
uphold, & Schmidtke, 2016) and the contribution which
interest groups add to the (non-) politicization of EU
policy-making processes, an aspect which has so far not
received any systematic attention in this debate. We use
policy mobilization as the first central concept to struc-
ture our analysis of interest group advocacy and conflict
in EU policymaking. In contrast to existing studies, we
thus focus on mobilization per policy proposal in legisla-
tive EU politics, rather than on groupmobilization in gen-
eral, following common findings in the literature that the
issue-context matters for interest mobilization (Klüver,
Braun, & Beyers, 2015). We capture interest group mo-
bilization along a scale ranging from zero, i.e., no mobi-
lization, to the maximum number we observe in our pol-
icy sample.
Our other two central concepts focus on conflict be-
tween groups. We distinguish two types of conflict: First,
the level of policy polarization among interest groups,
and, second, the level and type of between-group divi-
siveness, i.e., the number of conflicting positions voiced
by different types of groups. Policy polarization refers
to the positions that groups take vis-à-vis the legislative
proposal submitted by the EC to the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament (EP). These positions can range from
a group’s full support of a proposal to fundamental op-
position to it. Policy polarization captures the extent to
which positions voiced by interest groups vary on spe-
cific issues of a policy proposal and not the degree of
support or opposition vis-à-vis the EC’s policy proposal.
If all groups take the same supportive position, there is
no polarization of interest groups’ positions vis-à-vis the
EC’s proposal. In a case of non-polarization, groups could,
for example, unequivocally agree in their opposition to
or support for a policy proposal. Policy polarization ac-
cordingly increases with an increasing variety of inter-
est groups’ positions on a policy proposal and thus cap-
tures the (level of) conflict amongst themselves which
interest groups introduce into EU policymaking. A pos-
sible explanation for limited policy polarization could be
reputational concerns of interest groups. They want to
come across as trustworthy and knowledgeable inter-
locutors, allowing them to enter stable, non-conflictual
and reciprocally beneficial relationships with policymak-
ers (Browne, 1990; Gray & Lowery, 1996; Heaney, 2004;
Lowery, 2007, p. 51). In order not to damage their trust-
worthy reputation, interest groups are tempted to adopt
a supportive attitude and refrain from expressing strong
opposition to policy proposals. Therefore, we expect pol-
icy polarization among interest groups as well as oppo-
sition to the EC’s policy proposals generally to be rela-
tively low. At the same time, levels of policy mobilization
are likely to correlate positively with policy polarization:
If policy proposals attract the attention of many interest
groups, they may show less restraint in voicing opposi-
tion. For proposals with high levels of interest group mo-
bilization, groups may have incentives to demonstrate to
their members and potential members that they are ac-
tively trying to secure their interests. Consequently, the
level of policy polarization should be greater for propos-
als with high levels of interest group mobilization than
those with low levels.
Our third analytical focus lies on between-group di-
visiveness. Between-group divisiveness addresses the re-
lationship between the type of interest represented and
the positions groups take when mobilizing. While policy
polarization is about the conflict among interest groups
and policymakers, between-group divisiveness is about
the extent to which groups’ positions vary between dif-
ferent types of groups. We distinguish two types of
interests: business and non-business groups. Some re-
cent scholarship on interest groups suggests structural
between-group divisions in which business groups are
consistently pitted against groups representing broader
citizen interests (Bernhagen, 2012; Dür et al., 2015,
p. 952). Moreover, there are a number of studies that
show that business groups and citizens groups are un-
equally endowed with resources and that the former’s
greater ability to keep generating greater resources over
a prolonged period of time provides themwithmore pol-
icy influence (Gilens & Page, 2014; but see Baumgartner
et al., 2009; Klüver, 2011) and better access (Dür & Ma-
teo, 2013, 2014; Eising, 2007).
In order to assess the nature of conflict between
business and non-business interests, we conceptualize
between-group divisiveness in two ways: structural con-
flict and cross-type conflict. First, we denote divisions
between business and non-business interest groups as
structural conflict, when business groups voice positions
on all contested issues of a policy proposal that are in-
variably in opposition to the positions voiced by non-
business groups. Second, divisions between groups can
also run right across business and non-business inter-
ests. We denote mobilization patterns in which busi-
ness and non-business interests take the same positions
and oppose other business or non-business interests as
cross-type conflict. We empirically investigate the extent
to which between-group divisiveness matches the pat-
terns characterizing structural conflict or rather those
that characterize cross-type conflict. Should our explo-
ration show that cross-type conflicts are a regular occur-
rence in policy mobilization in the EU and that structural
conflicts are rare, wewill take this finding as an indication
that mobilization in the EU is driven by interest groups’
policy-specific rather than by their structural interests.
3. Data and Research Design
To analyse aggregate patterns of interest group mobiliza-
tion and conflict, we adopt a policy-centred research de-
sign. Such a design not only allows us to examine policy
mobilization across different policy domains or institu-
tional venues, but also to relate interest group activity
to specific characteristics of concrete policy initiatives,
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such as the number of issues, i.e., contested aspects of
a policy proposal, or the variation of interest groups’ po-
sitions. This policy-centred design uniquely allows us to
examine the relationship between interest groups’ policy
mobilization and political conflict at the level of specific
legislative cases (see Baumgartner et al., 2009, for a sim-
ilar design). We use data from the INTEREURO project,
which analyses lobbying and interest group influence for
a sample 125 European legislative proposals (directives
and regulations) which the EC submitted between 2008
and 2010. As political attention is generally character-
ized by highly non-linear distributions with a small num-
ber of highly contested cases, we did not opt for an un-
weighted randomized sampling procedure. Instead, our
sampling strategy aimed at striking a balance between
having enough cases with at least some political mobi-
lization as well as sufficient cases where no or little lob-
bying takes place. To select politically contested EU leg-
islative proposals, we relied on their coverage in five
news sources: Agence Europe, European Voice, the Fi-
nancial Times, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and
Le Monde (Beyers, Dür, Marshall, & Wonka, 2014b).
We randomly selected 48 proposals for directives
and 41 proposals for regulations that were mentioned in
at least two media sources. This low threshold ensures
substantial variation in public salience across proposals
in the sample. To introduce sufficient variation, we also
included a randomly selected set of nine proposals for di-
rectives and nine proposals for regulations that did not
meet the media coverage criterion. Finally, we added
18 legislative proposals for which the EC held public con-
sultations andwhere consultation documents were avail-
able. We did this for pragmatic reasons as we wanted
to benefit from the additional data that is available for
consultation cases. Although we sampled 125 legislative
proposals, our analyses are based on a set of 116 distinct
legislative cases because 16 proposals were―in different
ways―highly interconnected and should be seen as part
of one legislative initiative consisting of two to four leg-
islative proposals. Sincewe applied a threshold to ensure
variance regarding levels of mobilization and conflict in
our random sample of proposals, we think our sample
is highly appropriate to arrive at externally valid findings.
The sample comprises a substantive share of proposals
going beyond a few highly salient and conflictual cases
that are foremost in the minds of citizens and scholars
and which should (because of its random nature) reflect
the universe of proposals on whichmobilization and con-
flict can be observed (Beyers et al., 2014b).
The mapping of policy mobilization started with the
archiving of news articles reporting on organized inter-
ests that were politically active on a particular legislative
proposal (see Table 1; STEP I). In addition, we conducted
two sets of interviews. First, 95 experts in the EC were
interviewed (STEP II). During these interviews 125 policy
issues as well as 460 interest groups that were lobbying
on a proposal, but were notmentioned inmedia sources,
were identified. Next (STEP III), these interviews with EC
experts were followed by 143 interviews with EU-level
interest group representatives involved in lobbying on
these legislative proposals (Beyers, Braun, Marshall, &
De Bruycker, 2014a). The largest part (64%) of our inter-
est group respondents represent business associations,
another 28% represent NGOs, and the remaining 8 per-
cent are officials from professional organizations, firms,
or labour unions.
The interviewswith EC-experts covered 67 policy pro-
posals while the interviews with interest group officials
focused on 72 policy proposals. One of the most impor-
tant reasons why we did not interview EC-experts or in-
terest groups’ representatives on all 116 cases is that our
pre-research showed that in 38 cases almost no lobbying
took place (see below). We dropped another six cases
because we could not convince interest groups to share
their views on them. In total, we identified 1,027 indi-
vidual interest groups that were active in the sampled
cases. As quite a number of groups were involved in pol-
icymaking on several policy proposals, they appear mul-
Table 1.Mapping mobilized interests for 116 legislative proposals.
Number of interest groups identified Number of policy issues identified
in relation to cases
STEP I: media analysis 625 actor involvements
967 statements in 474 articles
STEP II: 95 expert interviews (EC) 460 actor involvements 125 issues
STEP III: 143 interviews 273 additional actor involvements 176 issues on top of what we
with interest group officials (not identified in STEP I AND II) identified in STEP I
Additional actors and issues identified 186 38 issues not identified in earlier steps
through other sources (websites, other (not identified in STEP I, II and III)
media sources, short telephone
interviews, interviews with MEPs)
Total number of groups and 1,544 dyads 339 issues
issues identified 1,027 unique groups
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tiple times in the dataset. This leads to an overall num-
ber of 1,544 instances of interest groups that were iden-
tified―through our media analyses and the personal in-
terviews―in connection with the sampled policy cases.
In our interviews with the EC and organized interests,
we identified 298 important issues in these proposals,
and an additional 38 in those with officials from the EP
(Baroni, 2014). For each proposal, we tried to identify key
lines of conflict as well as the policy position of the mo-
bilized interest group. On 47 issues, we were not able to
interview interest groups because none were active on
the issue, or because we could not find an interest group
willing to cooperate, or because the interviewee did not
have sufficient recollection of the issue. Hence, 292 of
the 339 issues were covered by interviews with at least
one interest group. As groups did not always articulate
a clear position, because respondents refused to answer
or did not remember details, we lack position informa-
tion on 20 issues. Detailed evidence on N = 272 issues
allows us to assess the policy contestation (groups’ po-
sitions vis-à-vis the EC’s policy proposal), policy polariza-
tion (the variation between position on a policy proposal)
and between-group divisiveness (the extent to which po-
sition vary between different types of groups). We mea-
sured contestation and polarization by asking respon-
dents to assess whether the lobbying activities for each
issue aimed: 1) at “seeking major changes” or at “block-
ing the proposal”, 2) “supporting the proposal, but ask-
ing for changes”, or 3) “supporting the EC proposal as it
stands”. All media statements were coded in the same
way. We can, therefore, assess the level of conflict at
the level of legislative proposals as well as at the level
of specific issues, i.e., specific aspects of a specific leg-
islative proposal.
4. Empirical Analysis: Policy Mobilization and Patterns
of Conflict
We start by analysing policy mobilization. Figure 1 ranks
the sampled proposals with those generating most lob-
bying attention to the left. As expected, policy mobiliza-
tion varies considerably across policy proposals. Only a
relatively small number attract the attention of many
groups, while for most proposals we observe the mo-
bilization of only a dozen or fewer interest groups. In
6 cases, no single interest group provides useful informa-
tion and in 38 cases, short telephone interviews (with EC-
experts and interests groups), media sources and other
documents demonstrate no interest group mobilization.
At the same time, of the total set of 116 policy proposals,
72 are characterized by at least some policy mobilization.
Moreover, within this set policy mobilization is heavily
skewed. In fact, the mobilization efforts of about 50 per-
cent of all groups (N = 1,544) that we identified concern
only 20 percent of the 116 policy proposals. In addition,
business interests are considerablymore active in EU pol-
icymaking than non-business groups. As Figure 2 shows,
in the large majority of policy proposals in our sample,
the share of business groups that mobilized is consider-
ably higher than that of non-business groups. The fact
that increasing levels of mobilization are characterized
by a dominance of business groups contradicts the argu-
Figure 1. Number of identified interest groups (n = 1, 544).
Figure 2.Mobilization of business and non-business groups (n = 1, 544).
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ment that citizen and other diffuse interest groups profit
from an expansion of conflict (Schattschneider, 1960).
Public interest groups’ reliance on outside lobbying and
an expansion of conflict to compensate structural disad-
vantages (Dür & Matteo, 2013) might thus be of limited
political effectiveness. Interestingly, this is particularly
true for those policy proposals which led to high levels
of policy mobilization. Thus, while interest groups are ac-
tively engaging in EU policymaking, their relevance in EU
policymaking differs greatly across policy proposals. The
vast majority of legislative policymaking processes gain
little or no attention from organized interests.
The Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the scope of political mo-
bilization on 116 EU legislative proposals.
A (Spearman rho) correlation of 0.78 confirms the
positive relationship between the number of contested
issues (Figure 3) and the level of policy mobilization (Fig-
ure 1). Contested policy issues are specific aspects of a
legislative proposal where organized interests took a con-
flicting position and disagreed on the preferred policy
outcome. A typical example of such an issue is the test-
ing of non-human primates in research as part of an EC
proposal on animal protection [COM (2008) 543], where
policy positions varied from outright opposition and to-
tal abolition of testing to continuation of the status quo
based on best practices. The fact that encompassing mo-
bilization (towards the left side of Figure 1) is positively
related to the number of contested issues indicates that
a policy’s regulatory scope influences interest group at-
tention. Policy proposals with a broader scope attract
the attention of a larger and more diverse set of inter-
est groups that raise diverse demands and target a larger
number of policy issues. On the other hand, in policy-
making processes characterized by low levels ofmobiliza-
tion (right side in Figure 1) interest groups deal with a
rather specific and limited number of issues.
Having investigated levels of policy mobilization, we
now turn to our analysis of political conflict and the re-
lationship between policy mobilization and political con-
flict. In the section above we differentiated between two
types of conflicts: policy polarization (Table 2), i.e., the
positions taken by interest groups on policy proposals
and between-group divisiveness (Figure 2), i.e., the types
of groups opposing each other. While the unit of analy-
sis remains policy proposals, we draw on issue-level in-
formation for groups’ positions and our assessment of
political conflict caused by interest groups (for the 72 pro-
posals for which we have data).
We start by analysing policy polarization, which we
measure with the ordinal dispersion index (ranging from
0 to 1) of the different positions adopted by interest
organizations with respect to the contested issues. For
one third (N = 39, Table 2, leftmost column) of the pol-
icy proposals, we observe no controversy among inter-
est groups. In addition, we observed limited opposition
of interest groups to 25 policy proposals: interest groups
only asked for major changes or tried to block the whole
proposal in 10 out of 72 issues of these 25 policy propos-
als, while they voiced full support for 31 issues (37 per-
cent; see Table 2). The average level of policy polariza-
tion for these policy proposals, i.e., the average varia-
tion of interest groups’ issue positions in these propos-
als, is 0.2 (Table 2, rightmost column). The proposals on
which we observed limited controversy and a low level
of policy polarization are also characterized by relatively
low levels of mobilization (8.7 groups; Table 2, column 3).
One typical example of a policy for which we observe
limited polarization is the 2009 EC proposal laying down
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers
[COM(2008)815]). While some member states pledged
for there to be a low level of harmonization of minimum
standards for the reception of asylum seekers, the Euro-
pean Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and Amnesty
International supported the EC in favour of a full harmo-
nization. Indeed, there was some controversy, particu-
larly among the member-states and the EC although lob-
byists and the EC were largely on the same page for this
particular legislative case of asylum policy. In addition,
for 21 percent of the proposals, we find moderate lev-
els of policy polarization (0.4; Table 2). The number of is-
sues thatwere contested by interest groups in policymak-
ing on these proposals was considerably higher than in
cases with limited polarization (147 versus 72) as was the
share of issues on which interest groups asked for major
changes (25 percent) as well as the average number of
groups that mobilized on these proposals (15.7; Table 2).
Finally, 20 percent of the policy proposals attracted
relatively high attention from interest groups (35 inter-
est groups) which were contesting in total 186 issues,
i.e., about 45 percent of all contested issues. These pol-
Figure 3. Number of policy issues (n = 339).
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Table 2. Policy polarization by interest groups in EU policy-making.
Policy
Mobilization Issue scope Position polarization
Share of N mobilized N issues N groups that N groups N groups Level of
proposals groups on which demand major supporting supporting group
from (average groups took changes or proposal, but the proposal conflict
overall number per a position blocking the demanding as proposed (average
sample proposal, (N issues/%) proposal changes (N groups, %) dispersion,
min-max) (N groups, %) (N groups, %) 0–1)
N = 5 policies 5% — — — — —
no information
N = 39 policies 33% — — — — —
no polarization
N = 25 policies 22% 8.72 63 (23%) 10 (14%) 31 (43%) 31 (43%) 0.2
N = 72 positions (3–12)
limited
polarization
N = 24 policies 21% 15.67 99 (36%) 40 (27%) 61 (41%) 46 (31%) 0.4
N = 147 positions (13–20)
moderate
polarization
N = 23 policies 20% 34.96 110 (40%) 71 (38%) 67 (36%) 48 (26%) 0.6
N = 186 positions (23–93)
considerable
polarization
Total (N) = 116 100 272 121 159 125
icy proposals are characterized by considerable policy po-
larization (0.6) which results from many groups taking
opposing positions on the issues of these proposals (Ta-
ble 2). One example of a policy that led to strong pol-
icy contestation of interest groups vis-à-vis EC proposals
and to considerable conflicts between interest groups is
the legislative proposal on combating the sexual abuse of
children and child pornography [COM (2010) 94]. A con-
troversial issue in that policy concerned the question of
whether or not to block child pornography on the inter-
net. More concretely, a coalition of children right groups
advocated the compulsory blocking of these websites,
while some internet rights groups argued for the prohi-
bition of blocking and “Internet freedom”.
Our analyses of policy polarization show a signifi-
cant relationship between the levels of mobilization and
policy polarization: when a relatively large number of
groups mobilize on a policy proposal, they address a rel-
atively high number of policy issues which results in a
relatively strong polarization of the positions taken by in-
terest groups on policy proposals (Table 2). As previously
discussed, interest groups have an incentive to limit con-
troversy with policymakers because of their mutually de-
pendent relationship. The fact thatweobserve no or only
moderate polarization for 55 percent of the policy pro-
posals (33 + 22; second row in Table 2) and substantial
support even in mobilization processes that lead to high
levels of policy polarization (31 percent and 26 percent,
Table 2, columns 5 and 6) is in line with this argument
(Heaney, 2004; Lowery, 2007).
In Figure 2 we show that for a large share of policy
cases both business andnon-business interest groupsmo-
bilize, but that inmost instances business groups outnum-
ber the mobilized non-business interests. Yet, the ques-
tion is to what extent the mobilization pattern in EU lob-
bying reflects structural cleavages. Therefore, we turn to
the analysis of between-group divisiveness and the ques-
tion of who is opposing whom. The analytical focus is on
what we conceptualized as structural conflicts and cross-
type conflicts. While our unit of analysis is legislative pro-
posals, we draw on issue level data to identify interest
groups’ (issue) positions in specific policy debates. More-
over, while our analytical focus is on structural conflicts
and cross-type conflicts, we also identify those policy pro-
posals in which neither structural nor cross-type conflicts
occurred. The prevalence of cross-type conflicts may well
be an indication that policies and their potential effects
rather than the type of interest represented by a group
(i.e., business or non-business) drive conflict between in-
terest groups during their policy mobilization efforts.
Figure 4 shows that structural conflicts are actually
quite rare during interest groups’ mobilization on EU
policy proposals. In one-third of policy proposals, only
business mobilized (N = 36) and, in far fewer cases


























Figure 4. Between-group divisiveness in interest groups’ EU policy mobilization (N = 116).
Note: Positions at issue-level. Proposals classified as marked by “cross-type conflict” if business and non-business groups
voiced similar positions (support, some change, major change/blocking) on at least one of the issues of the legislative case.
Proposals in which business and non-business groups never voiced similar positions on any of the issue that constitute the
proposal were marked as “structural conflict”.
(N= 6), only non-business groups voiced a clear position.
A substantial number of these policy proposals were only
weakly conflictual. In addition,weobserve structural con-
flicts only in policymaking processes in five of the 116
policy proposals. At the same time, cross-type conflicts
are a more common feature in interest groups’ mobiliza-
tion on EU policy proposals (N = 22). These findings are
theoretically relevant in at least two regards: first, the
fact that in most policymaking processes we find mo-
bilization of one specific type of interest and the fact
that these policymaking processes are marked by lim-
ited contestation highlights the prevalence of the rather
non-conflictual character of interest group politics in EU
policy-making. Second, that cross-type conflict is more
prevalent than structural conflict indicates that policy
mobilization by interest groups and groups’ positions are
considerably driven by the substance of policies and their
potential effects on diverse constituencies. This observa-
tion speaks against a primordial understanding of policy
mobilization by EU interest groups as a process that pits
business against non-business interests. Instead, the ev-
idence suggests that mobilized interest group communi-
ties can be quite heterogeneous and diverse.
5. Conclusion
This article presented the first study to map aggregate
patterns of interest group mobilization and conflict in
EU legislative policymaking. Our policy-centred research
design and the systematic mapping of policy mobiliza-
tion for a substantial sample of policy proposals shows
that policy mobilization by interest groups in the EU
is strongly skewed: high levels of mobilization are re-
stricted to a relatively small number of policy proposals,
while most policy proposals are characterized by low lev-
els of policy mobilization (for similar findings see Baum-
gartner & Leech, 2001; Burstein, 2014; Halpin, 2011).We
also find low levels of policy mobilization to be related
to limited policy polarization and low levels of between-
group divisions. Policymaking processes with high levels
of policy mobilization are at the same time characterized
by high levels of policy polarization (Table 2). Finally, re-
garding the nature of between-group divisions, we found
structural conflicts between business and non-business
interests to be rare. Cross-type conflicts, in which busi-
ness and non-business groups take the same positions
and oppose another heterogeneous community of busi-
ness and non-business groups taking similar positions
are more prevalent.
Our analyses contribute to the EU interest group lit-
erature and the scholarship on EU legislative policymak-
ing. First, our finding that cross-type conflicts are more
prevalent in EU policymaking (compared to structural
conflicts), suggests the need for further research into
the factors explaining groups’ position-taking in EU pol-
icymaking (Halpin & Jordan, 2009). While the analytical
distinction between different types of groups (e.g., busi-
ness or specific versus citizens or public interest groups)
may be important to account for varying levels of activi-
ties and resources (Dür & Mateo, 2012, 2013), it seems
less effective to account for the specific policy positions
adopted by interest groups and the political conflicts re-
sulting from them. In addition, our finding that policymo-
bilization is driven by cross-type rather than structural
conflict merits further research into the relationship be-
tween levels of mobilization and the nature of between-
group divisiveness.
Overall, we observed that groups contribute little
to the politicization of EU public policy. To obtain a
more comprehensive understanding of the level of con-
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flict in EU policymaking, future research could broaden
our perspective by investigating how policy mobilization
by interest groups relates to conflicts in other legisla-
tive arenas, the Council of Ministers and the EP, as well
as between political parties more generally (Helbling,
Hoeglinger, & Wüest, 2010; Hutter & Grande, 2014). EU
legislative policymaking is, in general, rather consensual
which, as we observe, seems to spill-over to the EU in-
terest groups’ arena (Mattila, 2009, p. 844; Thomson,
Boerefijn, & Stokman, 2004). In other words, in EU leg-
islative policymaking interest groups operate in an envi-
ronment in which policymakers show a rather limited in-
clination to engage in open political conflicts. This might
also discourage interest groups from open contestation
and might be reflected in the patterns of mobilization
which we have reported. Future studies could further un-
ravel this observation by identifying the conditions that
facilitate or contain the nature and scope of conflicts in
EU policymaking.
Although some EU policymaking processes are in-
creasingly politicized (De Wilde et al., 2016), at present,
there is no reason to believe that our findings (from
2008–2010) on interest group mobilization and interest
groups’ (limited) contribution to the contestation of EU
policy-making are not relevant. Even though recent cases
such as TTIP, glyphosate, and Brexit have illustrated the
politicizing potential of EU politics, still this politicization
will be limited to a few cases which feature on the news-
paper headlines and are forefront in the minds of citi-
zens and scholars (De Bruycker, 2017). The lion’s share
of policy conflicts still unfold under the radar of pub-
lic scrutiny and are characterized by an absence or low
level of conflicts. Future studies could further explore
the theoretical implications of our findings.Moreover, fu-
ture studies should investigate how the salience which
interest groups attribute to EU policies relates to the
salience assessments of other actors and to the overall
salience of EU (legislative) policy-making (Beyers, Dür, &
Wonka, 2017).
In line with elitist expectations (Olson, 1965;
Schattschneider, 1960), we observed that mobilized in-
terest group communities were dominated by business
lobby groups. However, the degree of business preva-
lence depends on the issues or policy area at stake (see
also Coen & Katsaitis, 2013) and conflicts between dif-
fuse and specific interest communities are the excep-
tion rather than the rule. We find that, quite regularly,
business and non-business interests take similar posi-
tions (see also Beyers & De Bruycker, 2017). The mobi-
lization bias of business organizations over civil society
groups might, therefore, be less problematic, or at least
less ubiquitous than sometimes argued. Future research
could further explore the biases that emerge within mo-
bilized business or civil society communities respectively.
Since intra-sectoral conflicts are commonplace in EU pol-
icymaking, it would be relevant to further explore the
nature of these conflicts and whether some business
groups systematically prevail over others.
Finally, of course, it would be very interesting to com-
pare our findings on interest groups’ policy mobilization
in the EU with studies on groups’ policy mobilization in
other political systems. This would allow us to assess if
and to which extent our findings reflect particularities of
the EU’s political system or if, as the few existing stud-
ies indicate (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Burstein, 2014;
Halpin, 2011), the patterns we found reflect more gen-
eral patterns. Comparative or comparatively oriented
studies would also allow us to investigate if and how in-
stitutional, policy- and party-system related factors con-
tribute to interest groups’ policy mobilization and the
policy polarization resulting thereof. We hope to be in
the position to make such comparisons in the future,
even if designing these studies and collecting the data
will be very demanding.
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